



# Solutions for the Second Quiz

COSC 6360

Fall 2017



# First question

- What characterizes a ***self-tuning*** cache replacement policy?
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- Which feature(s) of the ARC cache replacement make that policy self-tuning?
  -



# First question

- What characterizes a ***self-tuning*** cache replacement policy?
  - ***It does not require any workload-dependent adjustments.***
- Which feature(s) of the ARC cache replacement make that policy self-tuning?
  - ***It has no user-tunable parameter.***



# Alternate first question

- What characterizes a ***scan-resistant*** cache replacement policy?
  -
  
- Which feature(s) of the ARC cache replacement make that policy scan-resistant?
  -



# Alternate first question

- What characterizes a ***scan-resistant*** cache replacement policy?
  - ***Pages that are only accessed once are expelled faster than other pages.***
- Which feature(s) of the ARC cache replacement make that policy scan-resistant?
  - ***ARC maintains a separate list of pages that have been accessed once.***



# Second question

- What problem do Corey *kernel cores* address?



- How do they solve that problem?





## Second question

- What problem do Corey *kernel cores* address?
  - *In most OSes, system calls are executed on the core of the invoking process*
    - *Bad idea if the system call needs to access large shared data structure*
- How do they solve that problem?
  - *Kernel cores let applications dedicate cores to run specific kernel functions*
    - *Avoids inter-core contention over the data these functions access*



# Alternate second question

- What problem do Corey ***address ranges*** try to solve?



- How do they solve that problem?







# Alternate second question

- What problem do Corey *address ranges* try to solve?
  - *Current solutions do not let the cores of multicore applications access both shared and private data in an efficient fashion.*
- How do they solve that problem?
  - *They let applications define both shared and private address ranges in their address spaces.*



# Third question

- What *must happen* before Proof Carrying Code becomes widely used?





# Third question

- What *must happen* before Proof Carrying Code becomes widely used?
  - *We must find a cost-effective way to construct safety proofs for non-trivial extensions*



# Fourth question

- Consider a hypothetical 8-way associative L2 TLB with 2,048 entries
- What would be its coverage for a page size of 4 kilobytes?
  -



# Fourth question

- Consider a hypothetical 8-way associative L2 TLB with 2,048 entries
- What would be its coverage for a page size of 4 kilobytes?
  - **2K×4KB = 8MB**



# Alternate fourth question

- Consider a hypothetical 4-way associative L2 TLB with 1,024 entries
- What would be its coverage for a page size of 4 kilobytes?
  -



# Alternate fourth question

- Consider a hypothetical 4-way associative L2 TLB with 1,024 entries
- What would be its coverage for a page size of 4 kilobytes?
  - **1K×4KB = 4MB**



# Fifth question

- What do Navarro *et al.* propose to do whenever a process attempts to ***modify*** a superpage?



- Why?







# Fifth question

- What do Navarro *et al.* propose to do whenever a process attempts to ***modify*** a superpage?
  - ***Whenever a process attempts to modify a superpage, that superpage is demoted and replaced by its constituent base pages***
- Why?
  - ***To avoid having to flush back the whole superpage when it will be expelled from main memory***



# Sixth question

- How does Nooks **recover** from an extension failure?
  -
- What is the **main limitation** of this approach?
  -



# Sixth question

- How does Nooks **recover** from an extension failure?
  - ***It restarts the extension.***
- What is the **main limitation** of this approach?
  - ***It does not work for all extensions.***



# Seventh question

- What is the major performance penalty occurring when Nooks crosses a ***lightweight protection domain boundary***?



# Seventh question

- What is the major performance penalty occurring when Nooks crosses a ***lightweight protection domain boundary***?
- ***Crossing protection boundaries requires switching the kernel page table, which results in a flush of the current TLB (and an avalanche of TLB misses).***